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RHETORICAL STRATEGIES, INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS: 
THE VISEGRÁD GROUP AND THE BALTIC COOPERATION 
FACING THE EU AND NATO ACCESSION PROCESS 
 
LUCIANA-ALEXANDRA GHICA 
 
 
 
Academic and policy literature frequently supports the idea that the process of accession 
to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might have triggered the 
emergence and development of functional regional cooperation in the former communist space. In 
this article, using the cases of the Baltic Cooperation and Visegrád Group, I argue that, far from 
being enhanced by the EU and NATO enlargement processes, the regional dimension rarely found 
itself at ease with the institutional requisites for accession to these two Western organizations. 
Keywords: European Union; NATO; Baltic Cooperation; Visegrád Group; enlargement.  
 
 
Since the fall of communism, the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe
1
 have created or engaged in over a dozen regional intergovernmental 
schemes of cooperation and various other smaller regional programs and 
activities. Although not equally interested in developing regional arrangements 
with their neighbours, all Central and East European states have involved in the 
process, with an average participation rate of three agreements per country. The 
speed to which this phenomenon has developed, as well as the fact that it 
emerged in an area where long-term non-defensive cooperation had never been 
the norm has puzzled many historians and political scientists during the last two 
decades. Most frequently, academic and policy literature advances the idea that 
the process of accession to the European Union and NATO might have 
triggered the emergence and development of functional regional cooperation in 
the former communist space.
2
 In this article, I argue that the relation between 
                                                          
1  Although there are many references to Central and Eastern Europe, as well as various 
criteria to distinguish it from the rest of the neighboring space, there is no agreement to what 
exactly it covers. For the purpose of this research, the notion refers to the former communist space.  
2  For some of the most notable contributions in this field, see OTHON ANASTASAKIS 
and VESNA BOJIŢIŠ-DŽELILOVIŠ, Balkan regional co-operation and European integration, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, The Hellenic Observatory, London, 2002; 
Andrew Cottey (ed.) Subregional cooperation in the New Europe: Building security, prosperity 
and solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea, Macmillan, London, 1999; Duško Lopandiš, (ed.) 
Regional cooperation in South Eastern Europe: The effects of regional initiatives, European 
Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, 2002; DIMITAR BECHEV, “Contested Borders, Contested 
Identity: The Case of Regionalism in South East Europe”, Journal of South East European and 
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regional intergovernmental cooperation and the accession process to these two 
organizations has been more complex. In fact, far from being enhanced by the 
EU and NATO enlargement processes, the regional dimension rarely found 
itself at ease with the institutional requisites for accession, in other contexts than 
the rhetorical ones.  
In order to investigate this issue, I chose two cases of regional 
intergovernmental cooperation – the Visegrád Group (V4) and the Baltic 
Cooperation (BC). The Visegrád Group is a regional initiative that has brought 
together Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary and 
Poland since 1991. Its original purpose was to support the withdrawal of these 
countries from the Warsaw Pact,
3
 and offer a framework for common defence in 
front of a potentially retaliatory USSR.
4
 With the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and after the European Community and NATO membership had been set 
as major foreign policy goals for the former communist states, the focus of this 
arrangement shifted towards softer security concerns, such as economy, civil 
society, ecology, culture, and communications. The Baltic Cooperation is a 
loose framework of cooperation among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
originating in their 1990 declaration of independence from the USSR.
5
 
Although initially oriented towards political and military security, since the 
second half of the 1990s the three partners have also preferred less problematic 
fields for their collaboration. 
The Visegrád Group and the Baltic Cooperation have been highly similar 
in many respects. They were established among a small number of neighbouring 
countries and have never expanded their membership. They were created 
around the same period initially to answer mainly the participants‟ common 
political and military security concerns. These concerns slightly varied in the 
                                                                                                                                              
Black Sea Studies 4, 1, 2004, pp. 77-96.; MILICA UVALIŠ, “Regional cooperation and the 
enlargement of the European Union: Lesson learned?”, International Political Science Review 23, 3, 
2002, pp. 319-33. 
3  Created in 1955 at the initiative of the USSR, the Warsaw Pact had been a regional 
military security aimed to counterbalance the Western security alliances, most notably the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, since its establishment, it had proved to be also 
a strong instrument through which the Soviet Union could control its European satellite countries. 
In the immediate aftermath of the regime change in 1989 and the early 1990s, the denouncement 
of the Warsaw treaty, was thus the most important political act to declare military and political 
independence from Moscow. For a comprehensive collection of documents on its history, 
including the increasingly tensioned relations between the USSR and the other East European 
communist regimes, see VOJTECH MASTNY and MALCOLM BYRNE (eds.), A cardboard 
castle? An inside history of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, Central European University Press, 
Budapest, New York, 2005. 
4  Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic 
of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration [English translation], 
Visegrád, 15 February 1991. 
5  Declaration on Unity and Cooperation by the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia and 
Republic of Lithuania [English version], Tallinn, 12 May 1990. 
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two cases. For the Visegrád countries, security was framed mainly in relation 
with the participation to and the existence of the Warsaw Pact. Instead, for the 
Baltic republics, the security rationale was dictated first by the need to gain 
independence from the Soviet Union. However, in both cases, achieving this 
primary security goal meant also the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the 
territory of the member states.
6
 Furthermore, once the political and military 
security threats diminished, both transformed into multisectoral agreements, 
covering various fields of collaboration, though political dialogue has remained 
their focus. Among all the Central and East European regional initiatives, the 
Visegrád Group and the Baltic Cooperation are the only arrangements whose all 
participants are currently full members of both the European Union and the 
NATO. All Visegrád and Baltic states acquired EU membership in 2004. The 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are NATO members since 1999, while 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia became NATO members in 2004.  
The two cases also differ. Most significantly, this happens with respect to 
the rhetoric and factors that have favoured the group cohesiveness. While the 
Visegrád members have strongly legitimized their cooperation in identity terms, 
the Baltic Cooperation never intended to develop or produced a sense of 
collective (regional) identity. Furthermore, the EU and NATO accession 
processes had different weights for the agendas of the Baltic states and the 
Visegrád countries. For the Visegrád Group countries, whose harder security 
concerns had been partially solved by the mid-1990s, the European Union 
became faster the more urgent priority. Instead, for Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, the vicinity of an unstable and often politically aggressive Russian 
Federation has meant a higher concern for the political and military security 
priorities. This translated into the fact that the NATO membership has been 
often perceived as the most important foreign policy target.  
 
 
The Visegrád Group: A pragmatic strategy 
 
From the very beginning, the Visegrád partners presented themselves to 
the Western partners as the more advanced states in the former communist 
camp. Beyond the political rhetoric, there was some truth in this. In 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, civil society had been more active and 
                                                          
6  The Soviet troops left Hungary and Czechoslovakia in mid 1991, while from Poland and 
the Baltic states they withdrew only in 1994. For an interesting analysis of the way in which this 
difference affected the military reform in these countries, see for instance JEFFREY SIMON, 
Hungary and NATO: Problems in civil-military relations, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Oxford, 2003; and JEFFREY SIMON, Poland and NATO: A study in civil-military relations, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, 2004. 
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stronger during the communist rule.
7
 Much of the resistance was based on the 
idea of no compromise with the regime, at least in principle, a fact which 
associated the opposition and dissidence movements in these countries with an 
image of moral superiority.
8
 During the last decade before the end of the Cold 
War, Hungary had experienced a more liberal regime compared to most of its 
neighbours. Poland and Hungary were the first to start the democratization 
process, organizing roundtable negotiations and free elections. The 
Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and the Polish President Lech Wałesa 
also enjoyed much prestige in the Western political, diplomatic and media 
circles due to their role in the disintegration of the communist regimes. These 
experiences enhanced the idea that the three countries were genuinely 
committed to democracy and its values, particularly when compared with the 
other former communist states. Furthermore, at the time of the break up with 
dictatorship, the three countries were slightly more advanced economically than 
their fellows in Comecon.
9
 
Nonetheless, the logic of presenting themselves as leaders has been 
double-edged, mostly with respect to the EU enlargement process. For the three 
former communist countries, the acknowledgement of the fact that they were more 
economically advanced was considered a promise for enlargement, which caught 
the European Community political leaders into a rhetorical trap.
10
 On the other 
hand, treating the Visegrád states as a group could have meant a serious delay in 
the accession, which could have been postponed until the weakest of all would 
have been prepared.
11
 From this perspective, strengthening the regional cooperation 
links might have meant a further delay in the EU accession, a problem quickly 
                                                          
7  See, for instance, VLADIMIR TISMĂNEANU, Reinventing politics: Eastern Europe 
from Stalin to Havel, Macmillan, New York, 1992. 
8  BARBARA FALK, The dilemmas of dissidence in East-Central Europe, Central 
University Press, Budapest, 2003; TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, We the People: The revolutions of 
1989, witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague, Granta, London, 1991. 
9  Literature on this issue usually presents the Visegrád Group as significantly more 
advanced than all the other communist regimes. However, macroeconomic indicators for the late 
1980s do not show a radically different picture when compared to the other communist 
economies. In fact, in many respects, the S.F.R. Yugoslavia was as much as an economic leader 
as Czechoslovakia or Hungary. One may indeed notice a more service oriented approach to 
economic growth, particularly in Czechoslovakia. This view on the economic development of the 
Visegrád countries may be rather a “contamination of the past” with the view on these states 
economic situation in the first half of the 1990s, when on average they performed better than most 
of the other former communist states. For a good overview of the macroeconomic indicators, see, 
for instance, Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, Comecon data 1989, 
Macmillan, London, 1990; and Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, Countries in 
transition, Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, Vienna, 1996.  
10  FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG, “The Community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and 
the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, International Organization 55, 1, 2001, pp. 47-80. 
11  MILADA ANNA VACHUDOVA, “The Visegrád Four: No alternative to cooperation?”, 
RFE/RL Research Report 2, 34, 27 August 1993, p. 46. 
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spot by the leaders of the Visegrád Group and rhetorically used for consolidating 
their countries‟ position in the race for Western organizations membership.  
For instance, the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments strongly 
opposed Poland‟s proposal for a minimal institutionalisation of the political 
arrangement among them, even if modelled after the European Community. 
Particularly the Czechoslovak and later Czech governments resisted such 
developments, claiming in late 1992 and early 1993 even that the EC initiated 
this proposal in order to stall the access of these countries to the Western 
institutions. At that time, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krystof 
Skubiszewski openly denied the interference of the EC in this plan of 
institutionalization.
12
 However, in an interview with the author, former Polish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw Geremek suggested that the proposal had 
belonged indeed to the Polish government but it partially aimed to answer an 
idea allegedly coming from EU circles. This idea was that cooperation at 
regional level among the former communist countries could prove their 
commitment to democracy, hence their democratic credentials necessary to be 
accepted as part of the “democratic club of the Western world”.13  
Interestingly, this argument was often used in relation with the 
establishment of regional cooperation schemes among the former communist 
states. Many policy-makers and scholars, irrespective of their institutional or 
national affiliation, hold the view that the development of international 
regionalism in post Cold War Central and Eastern Europe might have been a 
suggestion coming from the European Union. However, none of them can 
indicate at least one text originating in the Community institutions that 
requested the countries of the region to cooperate in the early 1990s. In fact, 
until the adoption of the Stability and Association Process, no major political 
EU document explicitly encourages the Central and East European countries to 
cooperate regionally.
14
 More plausibly, this could have been an idea developed 
within the European chancelleries and think tanks at the end of the Cold War, 
when many visions about the reorganization of the European security emerged. 
One of the potential configurations placed the former communist countries 
within a third group between the West and the Soviet Union. At that time, for 
some circles within the European Community, this may have been an easier 
choice for the Community as it did not require to accommodate new members, 
                                                          
12  VACHUDOVA, op.cit., p. 41. 
13  BRONISLAW GEREMEK, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, interview with 
the author, Oxford, 17 May 2006. 
14  The Stability and Association Process is a strategy of the European Union adopted in the 
early 2000s to cope with the instability of the Western Balkan space in the aftermath of the 1999 
war in Kosovo. Even in this case, the references to regional cooperation are mostly to the existing 
regional initiatives in South Eastern Europe, such as the Stability Pact and the SEECP, and 
emphasize the idea that regional dialogue and cooperation may help the partner countries to find 
easier practical solution to problems common in the region.   
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particularly in a period in which the organization was in the middle of a deep 
institutional reform process.
15
  
At the same time, the view that cooperation at regional level among the 
former communist countries could prove their commitment to democracy was a 
“free-floating idea” within the realm of international politics. In its essence, it 
belongs to the democratic peace theory sphere, because it is a reversal of the 
proposition “democratic states are more likely to cooperate,” which is corollary 
of this theory.
16
 Even if they were not aware of all the intricacies of the 
democratic peace arguments, it is probably safe to presume that many of the 
political leaders and diplomats of those times were accustomed with lay 
versions of these arguments through interaction within international institutions 
founded on principles related to democratic peace, most notably the United Nations.  
Whether or not the idea of strengthening regional cooperation among the 
Visegrád countries initiated within EU, it might have served the EU interest in 
delaying the accession process until both the new members and the EU itself 
were prepared. In this sense, the Czechoslovak position was right. However, by 
the time the Czechoslovak and later Czech leaders claimed that the European 
Union was encouraging the Visegrád cooperation in order to delay or even deny 
the accession of the Central European countries to this organization, the EU 
leaders were already preparing the document through which they acknowledged 
the possibility of enlargement for the former communist countries as long as 
they fulfilled several political and economic criteria.
17
 For this reason, the Czech 
aggressive position may be read rather as part of a strategy to differentiate the 
Czech Republic as a leader even within the Visegrád Group.18 Similarly, Poland 
aimed to distinguish itself as a “good pupil at the democratization lesson” 
answering the allegedly EU push for further cooperation within the Visegrád 
framework.
19
 Such rationales quickly created a rhetoric competition among the 
Visegrád partners. This competition grew when the governments realized that 
the EU enlargement process was individual and that the European Union did not 
favour a group approach for the access negotiations.
20
  
Apart from the rhetoric dilemmas, regional cooperation also generated 
                                                          
15  FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG, The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe: Rules and 
rhetoric. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. 
16  For good reviews of the democratic peace theory arguments, see for instance BRUCE RUSSETT, 
Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a post-Cold War world, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1993; and MICHAEL BROWN, SEAN M. LYNN-JONES, and STEVEN E. MILLER (eds.), 
Debating the Democratic Peace, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 1996. 
17  EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Conclusions of the European Council on relations with the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Copenhagen, 12-13 June 2003. 
18  VACHUDOVA, op. cit., p.41. 
19  BRONISLAW GEREMEK, interview with the author, Oxford, 17 May 2006. 
20  GÉZA JESZENSZKY, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, interview with the 
author, Budapest, 12 April 2006. 
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institutional problems in relation to the EU accession process. This was most 
visible at economic level. In 1992 the Visegrád countries established an 
economic cooperation framework of bilateral arrangements among themselves - 
the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). This should have helped 
the participants integrate better their economies and prepare them for European 
Community membership.
21
 However, the CEFTA often hindered the EU 
accession process. For example, the traditional market of Hungarian 
pharmaceutical products in Poland was severely hit by the access of German 
products, which according to the pre-enlargement arrangements were tax-
exempted.
22
 Similarly, the agriculture sector of the Czech Republic was 
frequently caught in-between the EU and CEFTA arrangements. The Czech 
agriculture policy was modelled on the Common Agricultural Policy of the 
European Community, which meant, among others, export subsidies and high 
tariff barriers. Such provisions impeded the liberalization of trade in agricultural 
products within CEFTA.
23
  
In short, strengthening the regional economic links might meant a serious 
setback in integrating economically within the European Community.  For such 
reasons and by common consent, the economic cooperation of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia within the framework of CEFTA remained 
underdeveloped. This was also the result of the divergent national interests of the 
member countries. For instance, Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic, less 
sympathetic towards political cooperation supported the economic collaboration 
within CEFTA. At the other end of the spectrum, the Polish government strongly 
encouraged political cooperation but was afraid that CEFTA could become a 
new Comecon. Slovakia highly isolated politically and with the most feeble 
economy of the four, supported both the political and the economic regional 
cooperation as a means to remain in the leading group.
24
 As for Hungary, whose 
economy closely followed the Czech one, the strengthening of economic 
relations among the Visegrád countries through formal institutions was 
perceived as a delay in the EU accession. Therefore, the Hungarian government 
insisted that each country be judged according to individual merits and efforts.
25
  
A relatively similar situation occurred also in the case of the NATO 
enlargement. At the time of the formal establishment of their grouping, the 
Visegrád countries emphasized their common security goals, which in the early 
1990s meant mostly having at least a privileged relation with the NATO and 
                                                          
21  The Visegrád Group, Central European Free Trade Agreement, Krakow, 21 December 1992. 
22  JOHN FITZMAURICE, “Regional co-operation in Central Europe”, West European 
Politics 16, 3, 1993, p. 393. 
23  VACHUDOVA, op. cit., p. 43. 
24  MARTIN DANGERFIELD, Subregional economic cooperation in Central and Eastern 
Europe: The political economy of CEFTA, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2000, 35-6. 
25  VACHUDOVA, op. cit., p.45. This evaluation was confirmed by the former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Hungary, Géza Jeszenszky, in an interview with the author, Budapest, 12 April 2006.  
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possibly acquiring the organization‟s membership. Externally, the Visegrád countries 
were already perceived as a group. For instance, in 1993 former U.S. National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski encouraged the four partners to apply 
jointly for NATO membership.
26
 Especially in American political and 
diplomatic circles, apparently also partially due to the strong Polish and 
Hungarian American lobbies,
27
 Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and to a 
lesser extent Slovakia were considered the potential first new members of the 
Alliance.
28
 However, far from being coagulator of common action, NATO was 
the subject of one of the first major disagreements between the four partner 
countries. In 1994, at a summit organized by the United States in Prague with 
the Visegrád states for introducing the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), the 
Czechs adopted an individualist attitude justified by the conviction that the 
Czech Republic was more advanced economically and politically than the other 
three. The Polish delegation accused the Czechs of having “hijacked the 
summit” but this did not impress the Czechs too much because several months 
later, Václav Klaus rejected both a closer cooperation within the Visegrád group 
and a formally common application for EU membership.
29
  
Although political meetings continued to take place periodically within 
the V4 framework, between 1994 and 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland acquired NATO membership, the political declarations and other 
documents that the organization produced suggest a diminishing concern with 
strengthening the Visegrád cooperation, simply acknowledging the usual 
technical issues discussed at the reunions. Furthermore, the number of reunions 
was significantly more reduced during 1994-1999 compared to 1990-1993. In 
addition, the subjects addressed after 1994 in the V4 format were less important 
for the joint political action of the group.
30
  
This decline continued after 1999, but that year marked the adoption of a 
new strategy within the Visegrád Group. With the NATO membership already 
acquired and the EU membership very close, apart from supporting the efforts 
of Slovakia to reach the same targets as the other three partners, the V4 needed to 
redefine its rationale. It did so in a landmark Prime Minister summit in Bratislava in 
May 1999. On that occasion, the Visegrád countries defined the guidelines for 
further cooperation after accession to NATO and the European Union. The 
document openly states in the first paragraph that the main area of substantive 
                                                          
26  BRONISLAW GEREMEK, interview with the author, Oxford, 17 May 2006. 
27  GALE A. MATTOX, “United States: Stability through engagement and enlargement”, in 
GALE A. MATTOX and Arthur R. Rachwald (eds.) Enlarging NATO: The national debates, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2001, pp.15-33. 
28  MARTIN A. SMITH and GRAHAM TIMMINS, Building a bigger Europe: EU and 
NATO enlargement in comparative perspective, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000, pp. 45-9. 
29  COTTEY, op.cit., p.78. 
30  For instance, in 1997, the official chronology of the organization records only one major 
event, a reunion of V4 Red Cross committees. 
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cooperation between the partners should be “the maintaining of the Visegrád 
regional profile („image-PR‟): consultations and issuing, as and when the need 
arises, of joint statements on issues of common interest, regular meetings of V4 
ambassadors”.31 In other words, the four countries publicly acknowledged that 
the Visegrád label was an asset useful for other foreign policy purposes.  
This approach became even more visible after the 2004 EU accession, 
when a new redefinition of the content of the cooperation placed culture and 
education in the forefront, with the Visegrád “single civilization sharing cultural 
and intellectual values and common roots in diverse religious traditions” as the key 
concept.
32
 Instead, with respect to cooperation within the EU and NATO, the 
four partners no longer aimed at having joint statements but only “consultations 
and co-operation on current issues of common interest”.33 In short, within the 
EU and NATO, it seemed that the Visegrád mission partially finished with the 
accession. Indeed, after 2004 there are significantly less joint actions and many 
more reunions in the newly branded V4+ format (i.e. Visegrád countries plus 
neighbours, commonly Slovenia). This happens mostly within the framework of 
the European Union. Joint declarations of the V4 are even rarer within the 
NATO, where each country seems to have an individual approach, with Poland 
being the most visible in this respect.  
 
 
The Baltic Cooperation: An non-engaging commitment 
 
The way in which the Baltic Cooperation (BC) evolved in relation to the 
EU and NATO enlargement has some similarities with the evolution of the 
Visegrád group. Mostly, before enlargement, the BC was used for political 
consultation in relation to the accession process to the two organizations but not 
for developing strong links among the participants. Like in the case of the 
Visegrád cooperation, the EU enlargement led to a competition among the three 
countries, with the more economically advanced Estonia behaving relatively 
similarly to the Czech Republic. Its strategy succeeded and, unlike the other two 
Baltic neighbours, it was included in the first wave of candidate countries with 
which the European Union decided to begin negotiations in 1997, the so-called 
“Luxembourg group.” Instead, in the NATO enlargement process, Lithuania 
took the lead. It was the first to apply for a NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
and it pursued an individualistic approach to NATO membership, hoping even 
to be nominated for that in the 1997 NATO Madrid summit, together with the 
                                                          
31  The Visegrád Group, Contents of the Visegrád Cooperation approved by the Prime 
Ministers’ summit, Bratislava, 14 May 1999. 
32  The Visegrád Group, Summit Declaration, Kromĕřìž, 12 May 2004. 
33  Ibid. 
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Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
34
 The three states finally joined at the 
same time the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance in 2004 but their 
common positions within the Baltic Cooperation does not indicate in anyway 
that their consultation within this framework might have had a role in this respect.  
What may account primarily for this lack of cohesiveness of the Baltic 
Cooperation with respect to the EU and NATO enlargement is the different 
foreign policy focus. For instance, Estonia has strong relations with Finland, 
Latvia has preferred to develop its relations with Germany, Sweden and 
Denmark, while Lithuania has closer relations with Poland and Russia.
35
. 
Moreover, the Baltic Cooperation has not been the most important regional 
initiative in which the three republics have involved, the Council of Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS) and the Nordic Baltic Council (NB8) having been regarded as 
more significant for all of them.
36
 The different foreign policy options with 
respect to the Russian Federation may have also had played a more important 
factor for the BC cohesiveness than the European Union and NATO accession 
process. In fact, unlike the 1991 Visegrád Declaration which focused mostly on 
the “return to Europe” and only subsidiary addressed the issue of distancing 
from Moscow, which by that time had been solved to a significant extent, the 
1990 Unity Declaration that established the Baltic Cooperation was the main 
instrument for adopting a common position of the three Baltic republics in 
relation with the Russian government. It is not only the founding text but also 
the one in which the cohesiveness of the group is expressed most vigorously. 
Only once the group cohesiveness was expressed as powerfully as in 1990. This 
happened in 1993,
37
 when the independence of the Baltic states‟ foreign policy 
was threatened after Russia introduced the concept of its “near abroad” as a way 
to justify that the NATO should not extend into the Baltic area, still considered 
                                                          
34  Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald (eds.) Enlarging NATO: The national debates, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2001; GRAZINA MINOTAITE, “The Baltic States: In search 
of security and identity”, in C. Krupnick (ed.) Almost NATO: Partners and players in Central and 
East European security, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2003. 
35  BERND SCHÜRMANN, “Estonia: Confronting geostrategic limits”, in Gale A. Mattox 
and Arthur R. Rachwald (eds.) Enlarging NATO: The national debates, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, London, 2001, pp. 219-37; ERIK MÄNNIK, “The role of the ESDP in Estonia‟s 
foreign policy”, in Clive Archer (ed.), New security issues in Northern Europe: The Nordic and 
Baltic states and the ESDP, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 139-54; ŽANETA OZALIŅA, 
“European Security and Defense Policy: The Latvian Perspective”, in Clive Archer (ed.), New 
security issues in Northern Europe: The Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP, Routledge, 
London, 2008, pp. 115-3; GRAZINA MINOTAITE, “Lithuania‟s evolving security and defense 
policy: „not only consumer but also contributor‟”, in Clive Archer (ed.), New security issues in 
Northern Europe: The Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 155-73. 
36  CARL-EINAR STALVANT, “The Council of the Baltic Sea States”, in Andrew Cottey (ed.) 
Subregional cooperation in the New Europe: Building security, prosperity and solidarity from the 
Barents to the Black Sea, Macmillan and EastWest Institute, London, 1999, pp. 46-68. 
37  The Baltic Cooperation, Declaration of the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
the Baltic States, Tallinn, 6 December 1993. 
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by Russia in its own security sphere of influence.
38
 After 1994, the relations of 
each Baltic country with Russia have been different and have not generated 
similarly strong common positions compared to the 1990 and the 1993 
declarations. For instance, from the three countries, only Lithuania managed to 
sign a border treaty with Russia, mainly due to its special location in relation 
with the Kaliningrad enclave, as well as due to the fact that Russian oil and gas 
pipelines transit Lithuania to Western Europe.
39
 Latvia also partially normalized 
its relations with Russia, as it has increasingly perceived Moscow no longer as a 
security threat but as a large neighbour with deep domestic problems that can 
indirectly affect Latvian security.
40
 Estonia shares a similar view with Latvia 
but adds to it the particular environmental and nuclear security concerns that 
have been manifested in relation with Moscow since the 1970s.
41
   
Despite these different foreign policy strategies and the lack of 
institutional cooperation, the Baltic states have been treated as a group by third 
parties, particularly by the United States. For instance, at the initiative of the 
American administration, the three republics signed in Washington a Baltic 
Charter. At first sight, this was an open support for the NATO accession. By 
that time, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania realized that, unlike in the case of EU 
accession, NATO was a process involving less competition among them and 
they were even encouraged to act as a group.
42
 However, as Martin Smith and 
Graham Timmins convincingly argue, the Baltic Charter, which had more 
economic than political security provisions, expressed rather the US 
administration‟s view that “EU enlargement, coupled with an established and 
growing US economic and commercial presence in the region, was the most 
realistic approach” given the Russian opposition to NATO enlargement in the 
Baltic area.
43
 In this way, the Baltic states were pushed to act as a group not 
necessarily of their own will. Without the enlargement conditionality, the 
already loose cohesiveness of the initiative diminished even more. Although 
they agreed to continue cooperating in the BC format also after acquiring the 
NATO and EU membership, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania do not aim to 
differentiate themselves as a group within the EU,
44
 a fact that distinguishes 
them from the Visegrád Group. Furthermore, not only the common positions of 
                                                          
38  IRINA KOBRINSKAYA, “Russia: Facing the facts”, in Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald (eds.) 
Enlarging NATO: The national debates, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2001, pp. 169-85. 
39  MINOTAITE, Lithuania’s evolving security and defense policy…, pp. 160-1.  
40  OZALIŅA, op.cit., p. 123. 
41  SCHÜRMANN, op.cit., pp. 223-4. On the 1970s and 1980s Estonian actions with respect 
to these security issues, see for instance JOHN FITZMAURICE, The Baltic: A regional future, 
St. Martin‟s Press, London, 1992, esp. pp. 118-9. 
42  MATTOX, op.cit., p. 29. 
43  SMITH and TIMMINS, op.cit., pp. 60-1, emphasis in original. 
44  The Baltic Cooperation, Joint Statement of the Prime Ministers of the Baltic States, Kalvi, 
15 January 2003. 
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the Baltic States are very rare both within the North Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Union but these three states seem to currently orient their regional 
foreign policy agendas closer to the Nordic countries and sometimes to Poland 
rather then towards strengthening the links among themselves.  
 
* 
 
To sum up, the relation between the development of regional cooperation 
arrangements in Central and East Europe and the EU and NATO accession 
processes has been a complex one. Most importantly, these processes cannot be 
convincingly portrayed as triggering the formation of genuine functional 
cooperation at regional level in the former communist space. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War, the creation of loose regional initiatives in the area 
was a quick fix to the rapidly changing European security environment. For the 
more entrepreneurial governments in Central and Eastern Europe, the promotion 
of international regionalism seemed to be also an opportunity for a long waited 
rapprochement to the military and economic security organizations of the 
democratic West, while freeing themselves from the Soviet control. However, 
in relation to the EU and NATO accession, strengthening regional ties proved to 
be a double-edged instrument both on institutional and rhetorical grounds. As 
shown in the case of the Visegrád Group, the consolidation of regional 
economic cooperation hindered the economic integration within the European 
Community and vice versa. At rhetorical level, insisting on being considered as 
a group in the accession processes meant a delay in acquiring membership, as 
this could not have been granted until the least developed partner of the group 
was fully prepared. Coupled with the fact that progress in this preparation was 
judged solely on individual basis, these factors led to an increased competition 
among the regional initiatives partners and consequently to a diminishing 
cooperation within the regional arrangements. This was most visible in the case 
of the Baltic Cooperation, whose establishment and development was even less 
motivated by its members‟ will to involve in building frameworks of functional 
cooperation among themselves. For these reasons, it is very unlikely that 
functional regional cooperation develops on the medium run among the 
Visegrád or the Baltic partners within either the European Union or the North 
Atlantic Alliance, despite the fact that the partners expressed their desire to 
maintain their already existing links and have common actions. At most, as the 
recent dynamic of these initiatives seems to indicate, the two regional identity 
brands and particularly the “Visegrád cooperation” may be politically activated 
at any time as a rhetorical instrument.  
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